Beurteilung der Sicherheit eines komplexen Systems

Soviel zum „Geschtr isches ja o guet cho!“ …

[…] There are several references to flights that had gone before. The acceptance and success of these flights is taken as evidence of safety. But erosion and blow-by are not what the design expected. They are warnings that something is wrong. The equipment is not operating as expected, and therefore there is a danger that it can operate with even wider deviations in this unexpected and not thoroughly understood way. The fact that this danger did not lead to a catastrophe before is no guarantee that it will not the next time, unless it is completely understood. When playing Russian roulette the fact that the first shot got off safely is little comfort for the next.

Quelle: Personal observations on the reliability of the Shuttle

Via: The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security (auch sehr lesenswert!)